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Since opening up its economy to international trade and investment in the 1970s, China has 
undergone the largest transfer of rural populations to urban eras in modern history. In order to 
achieve these growth levels, massive migration was necessary in order to provide the armies of 
cheap labor that has been China’s comparative economic advantage and the very core of its 
economic development strategy. This thesis examines the history of, and tensions within, China 
migration policy, and its implication for China’s long-term position in the global economy. This 
thesis argues that China’s migration policy is attempting to reconcile two conflicting goals of the 
ruling elite. On the one hand, migration flows are necessary to fulfill China’s export-oriented 
industrial strategy, which requires vast amounts of cheap labor. On the other hand, the freedom 
of movement which migration requires poses a potential threat to social and political instability, 
especially if it sets the stage for independent civic mobilizations over the longer term. 
Maintaining the Hukou registration system as a form of residual control also encourages the 
existence of a large underclass of low wage workers who possess minimal rights in the areas to 
which they have migrated. The resulting income inequalities are themselves a source of social 
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This thesis addresses the issue of China’s experience with domestic migration, and the 
policy challenges this experience poses for the stability of China’s political and economic 
systems. 
Since opening up its economy to international trade and investment in the 1970s, China 
has undergone the largest transfer of rural populations to urban eras in modern history. Hundreds 
of millions of peasants have moved to the cities in order to participate in China’s explosive, 
exported-oriented economic growth. In order to achieve these growth levels, massive migration 
was necessary in order to provide the armies of cheap labor that has been China’s comparative 
economic advantage and the very core of its economic development strategy. 
At the same time, these population movements pose a significant policy challenge to 
Chinese elites. While the government wishes to exploit the country’s reservoirs of cheap labor, 
population movements on this scale bring with them the potential for political and social 
instability that could, if not properly managed, damage the government’s legitimacy. Even while 
encouraging this rural-urban migration, the government has continued to maintain the older 
system of Hukou, or household registration system. Within this system, the Chinese citizens are 
tied to their place of residence. Under communism, the Hukou system assured that Chinese lived, 
worked, and received public benefits by being tied to place. With the transition to a Chinese 
version of capitalism since the late 1970s, the security of the “Iron Rice Bowl” has been 
removed, and labor mobility has been encouraged as a matter of official development policy. 
Nonetheless, the Chinese authorities have been reluctant to give its citizens full freedom of 
movement for fear that uncontrollable population shifts would prove disruptive both of Chinese 
society and the position of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. 
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As a result of this maintenance of the Hukou system, China has developed a dual labor 
market in which large numbers of temporary migrant workers from other parts of China take 
low-wage employment in the burgeoning manufacturing sector. In contrast, urban Chinese that 
do have registration rights enjoy far greater access to employment opportunities and government 
benefits. 
This thesis examines the history of, and tensions within, China migration policy, and its 
implication for China’s long-term position in the global economy. This thesis argues that China’s 
migration policy is attempting to reconcile two conflicting goals of the ruling elite. On the one 
hand, migration flows are necessary to fulfill China’s export-oriented industrial strategy, which 
requires vast amounts of cheap labor. On the other hand, the freedom of movement which 
migration requires poses a potential threat to social and political instability, especially if it sets 
the stage for independent civic mobilizations over the longer term. Maintaining the Hukou 
registration system as a form of residual control also encourages the existence of a large 
underclass of low wage workers who possess minimal rights in the areas to which they have 
migrated. The resulting income inequalities are themselves a source of social discontent that may 
well threaten the legitimacy of Communist governance. 
How the Chinese government solves this dilemma has significant implications for the 
sustainability of China’s export-led industrialization, and with that the health of the global 
economy. In particular, the longer-term goal of transitioning China’s economy to a more 
demand-driven development path requires measures to narrow income inequalities that imply 
reforms to the current regime of population control. 
This thesis first provides historical background to the development of China’s household 
registration policies. Next, it surveys recent scholarship on the significance and effects of these 
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policies. Using this scholarship and other materials, the thesis then advances an argument 
regarding the unsustainable tensions arising out of the unanticipated and even contradictory 
effects of China’s present-day Hukou system.  Finally, the thesis concludes with a set of 
recommendations that seek to preserve the benefits of Hukou with regard for the realities of 





















II. Historical Background to the Modern Hukou System 
The Hukou (household registration) system was put into place in urban areas in 1951, and 
extended to the countryside four years later. By 1958, the arrangement was given a more 
permanent legal basis, and despite increasingly significant changes after the 1980s persists in its 
essentials in the present day. What is more, the Chinese Hukou system is different from other 
countries’ population registration. Not only does it collect population data, but it has also 
fundamentally structured the ability of citizens to move about and relocate their residences. The 
Hukou system has served as an integral component of the government’s ongoing efforts to 
monitor and otherwise control the country’s population.. 
Understanding how the Hukou system works requires some knowledge of its details. First 
and foremost are the system’s classification categories. There are two kinds of classifications of 
Chinese Hukou status. The first classification of citizens’ Hukou registration is based on the 
Hukou suozaidi (where the citizen is registered). This depends on the location of citizens’ 
permanent residences. Under the Hukou system, each person must register in one unique 
residence, typically located in an urban or rural area. Urban areas consist of both cities and towns 
of various sizes, while rural areas include villages as well as state-run farms (Chan and Zhang 
1999).  
In the period prior to China’s economic liberalization and even today, the local regular 
Hukou registration defined citizens’ abilities to undertake certain economic and social activities 
in a given place and to gain access to supplies of food, clothes and other daily essentials, for 
example, some job opportunities are limited to local Hukou registrants. When people want to 
find jobs (usually peasants seeking jobs in cities) in areas other than where their Hukou 
registration authorizes them to, they are often required to undertake a substantial process 
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whereby permission to relocate is petitioned from the public authorities in the jurisdiction of 
their existing Hukou registration.  
The second way of classifying household registration is the Hukou leibie, referring to the 
status, as opposed to the location, of the registration. These different statuses are commonly 
referred to as the "agricultural" and "non-agricultural" Hukou. Up to 1979, this distinction was 
crucial for deciding who had access to certain food supplies and other state-conferred benefits. 
What must be understood about Hukou leibie is that its distinctions are not grounded in 
geographical location. Indeed they are more important than where a citizen is actually located. In 
the very beginning the “agricultural”/”nonagricultural” distinction was indeed related to where 
citizens resided. However, as both the system and the economy changed, Hukou leibie became 
disconnected from what registrants actually did, in an economically relevant sense. Instead, it 
became a marker for citizens’ differential access to state resources and opportunities that have 
prevailed at any given time (Chan and Zhang 1999). 
These two classifications of household registration have been critical for the Chinese 
government’s management of rural-urban migration. Essentially, Hukou registration places two 
obstacles in the way of population movements from rural to urban areas. Thanks to its control 
over where people reside, the government can limit their activities to those locations. Thanks to 
the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural, the government creates a bifurcated 
society that makes it hugely difficult for people with agricultural Hukou to change to a 
nonagricultural one. Status conversions hardly occur at the discretion of individuals. The process 
of conversion is bureaucratically involved. Almost like a form of internal citizenship, a person’s 
Hukuo place and status is derived from his or her parents. Changes in Hukou registration, either 
of place or status, require the permission of local authorities, which may not be a routine matter. 
6 
 
(Chan and Zhang 1999). 
Within the framework of these residency distinctions, population movements from rural 
to urban areas must be countenanced by official approval of any migrations that imply a different 
Hukou location or a different Hukou status. In particular, the change in status is termed 
nongzhuanfei. In effect, for migratory movements to gain official recognition, permission must 
be granted for both a locational change in where people’s residences are recorded, and a status 
change which determines the benefits to which people are entitled. Official recognition of 
population shifts entails permit approvals and other relevant documents. Only with the successful 
completion of the bureaucratic process of nongzhuangei will a given instance of migration result 
in the acquisition of formal status as an urban resident (Chan and Zhang 1999).  
Citizens can and do work outside of their Hukou residences, with or without official 
permission. Liudong renkou are migrants working outside their Hukou residences. To do so 
legally requires that migrants register with the police after more than a three-day stay and acquire 
a zanzhuzheng, or temporary residential permit, after three months. Mangliu are illegal liudong 
renkou –migrants who have no authorization to relocate and are not properly registered as a 
qualified temporary resident after three-day stay or have no temporary resident permit after 
three-month stay outside their permanent Hukou residence. Such illegal migrants are not actively 
pursued or punished by the police. However, they live in at the margins of urban life without any 
legal status and are subject to forced repatriation to their Hukou residence if for whatever reason 
their presence comes to the attention of the authorities. 
 A migrant may live and work in one place for many years but still be considered a 
temporary Hukou-holding liudong renkou if he or she cannot get permission to convert his or her 
Hukou registration. Qianyi renkou are people who, by undergoing the process of nongzhuanfei, 
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do gain authorization to migrate to a new place and change the location (and sometimes also the 
type) of their permanent Hukou status. It is a one-time and legally permanent internal migration. 
The criteria for eligibility for this conversion of status vary from city to city. However, in general 
the prevalence of these Hukou conversion barriers in China represent a powerful shaper of the 
country’s internal migration patterns. From the point of view of public authorities, the Hukou 
system also serves as an economic development tool. Positive sanctions such as monetary 
rewards, promotions, and new jobs have been used to encourage people to resettle in certain 
designated places (e.g. autonomous regions) for policy purposes. 
Finally, population control motivated by domestic security concerns focuses on, 
zhongdian renkou –“targeted populations” of ethnic minorities (Tibetans, Uighurs, etc.) which 
the government desires to monitor and control for the purposes of social control and combatting 
criminal activities (Wang 2005). 
Since 1949, China has experienced three periods of population control. The first one, 
between 1949 and 1958 was the period of free migration. The second, from 1958 to 1978, was a 
period of strict control. The third period, from 1978 to the present, has seen a progressive, if 
uneven, loosening of Hukou controls. 
In the first period, there was no strict management of population registration, and people 
could migrate to anywhere as they wish. However, in that period, few people chose to leave their 
home to a strange city since wage rates, job opportunities and levels of urban development were 
almost the same everywhere. Farmers chose to work on their own fields rather than find 
employment in the cities. Conversely, urban workers had little incentive to leave their factory 
jobs. While living standards were generally low, people did not worry about their food, housing, 
children’s education and pension since the government took responsibility for their provision 
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within a planned economy. 
In 1954, Chinese government put into effect its first constitution, which granted citizens 
the right to migrate and live where they wanted.  However, in June 1955, the Chinese State 
Council promulgated rules that directed cities, towns and villages to build their own household 
registration system in order to calculate the number of population and distribute resources. From 
1956 to 1957, Chinese government implemented policies to limit and control the tendency of 
peasants to move to the cities. 
In January 1958, Mao Zedong signed an order establishing the first household 
registration system (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli). This provided for 
seven regulatory aspects of household registration: permanent residence, temporary residence, 
birth, death, domestic emigration, domestic immigration and modification. As a legal form, this 
regulation placed tight restrictions on migration from countryside to city and from city to city. 
This regulation was the first time to distinguish household registration as agricultural Hukou and 
non-agricultural Hukou, effectively abolishing the freedom of movement provided under in 1954 
constitution. By 1975, further constitutional reform canceled such regulation officially. 
With China’s adoption of capitalist economic reforms after 1979, the fundamental 
rationale behind the Hukou system changed.  Instead of serving to allocate resources in a planned 
economic system committed to egalitarian and communist values, Hukou became a tool for 
controlling the wave of rural to urban migration generated by China’s rapid development as a 
capitalist economy. 
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping canceled some regulations which restricted population 
mobility, ushering in a more relaxed period of population control. These looser regulations were 
a necessary aspect of the introduction of market-oriented economic reforms. In October 1984, 
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the Chinese State Council issued a policy allowing peasants to settle in towns if they could make 
a living there. The following year, the Ministry of Public Security promulgated rules specifying 
the annual rate at which nongzhuanfei conversions (i.e. from agricultural to non-agricultural 
status) could take place. In September 1985 a resident identification card was introduced 
nationally, which specified each citizen’s Hukou status as part of their identity information (He 
2005). 
In June 1997, the Chinese State Council and the Ministry of Public Security expanded the 
grounds for Hukou status conversions, ruling that peasants who set up small manufacturing or 
service businesses; migrant rural workers employed in small towns; administrative staff 
employed by public and private organizations (including private corporations); workers with 
certain technical skills; and citizens and their families who bought houses or built their own 
house legally all could apply for permanent residence Hukou of that town. 
These changes in registration policy took place against the backdrop of a dramatic 
transformation in China’s economic landscape. With the development of China’s overall 
industrialization, more and more people have moved from countryside to city and from city to 
city. In 1997, the number of population of migration in China was about 110 million. Domestic 
migration is becoming an irresistible tendency. 
In 1998, the State Council made four reform regulations about the household registration 
system. The first regulation concerned children’s options to live with father or mother. The 
second loosened policies governing couples who have different places of Hukou registration. 
Thirdly, men who are older than 60 and women who are older than 55, if they are live alone and 
want to live with their children, they can settle in their children’s city. Finally, investors and 
citizens who buy a big enough house in one city, citizens who have a house and stable income, 
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live in that city more than one year and are law-abiding can settle in that city. 
In addition, five enterprising cities—Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Xiamen and 
Hainan—have put into effect yet another Hukou reform policy called “blue-stamp Hukou” which 
predates some national reforms. In February 1994, Shanghai decreed that citizens who invested 
one million Yuan or more, or bought a big enough house, or have permanent residence and legal 
stable income can apply for Shanghai “blue-stamp Hukou”. Citizens who have “blue-stamp 
Hukou” and reach the category’s limit can transfer it to permanent residence Hukou. In January 
1996, Shenzhen adopted a similar policy in 1996, followed by Guangzhou in 1998. Because of 
the city’s special status, Beijing’s reform was cautious. In June 1999, Beijing municipal 
government implemented a policy called “work residence certification”. This policy is just 
restricted to outsiders who work with high technology industries, and this certification must be 
applied for by companies on their employees’ behalf. Outsiders who have such certification will 
enjoy the same treatment as Beijing residents when it comes to buying homes, educating 
children, and so on. After three years their companies can apply for their formal Beijing Hukou. 
In 2005, Chinese government began moves to abolish the distinction between agricultural 
Hukou and non-agricultural Hukou. Meanwhile, some provinces had already undertaken their 
own reforms. Starting in 2001, 15 provinces undertook to unify the registration function of 
Hukou by 2009. However, in most places, due to the absence of supporting entitlement reforms, 
people have continued to enjoy different rights depending on the place of their original Hukou, 
so the reform has been largely symbolic to date. In practice, most medium and large cities have 
gradually lowered the criteria for migrants to change Hukou identities with accompanying 
entitlements.  
Another reform has been the establishment of a parallel residence permit system, which is 
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intended to delink access to basic services for migrants from Hukou status itself. A number of 
large cities and provinces such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
Chongqing, and Chengdu have adopted the residence permit system. The approach differs across 
cities, with some offering easier access to permits but with more limited rights; others offering a 
better package of entitlements but with stricter criteria to obtain the residence permit (e.g., 
Shanghai); and others mixing the two approaches for those with temporary residence permits and 
those with permanent and fuller entitlements (e.g., Zhejiang). 
Local Hukou reforms are diverse and offer lessons for national efforts to deepen reform. 
They include, for example, a score system for Hukou conversion. In 2009, Guangdong 
introduced a cumulative points system to manage Hukou conversion. This is focused primarily 
on intra-Guangdong migrants, while the residence permit system regulates the entitlements of 
other migrants. Points are calculated based on education, vocational certificates and professions, 
years of social insurance contribution, social contributions such as blood donation and voluntary 
work, and government awards. In parallel, all migrants are encouraged to apply for residence 
permits to receive additional public services and welfare. The impact to date has, however, been 
lower than expected. With a three-year target of 1.8 million conversions, only 100,000 Hukou 
conversions were done in the first year. 
Another approach has involved strict and fixed conversion criteria with rationing. 
Shanghai was the first city to introduce the residence permit system open to all, but the 
qualifying conditions are among the strictest. The Shanghai system uses three categories. The 
first are those with college degrees or special talents and those who work, do business, or invest 
in Shanghai and their families. The second are those who have stable employment and housing. 
The third are those who are being reunited with family members who already posssess Shanghai 
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Hukou. Residence permit holders enjoy equal public services including children’s education, 
health and family planning services, training, social insurance, and driver’s licenses. They are 
required to make seven years of social insurance contributions before applying for urban Hukou. 
In addition, Shanghai has a tight overall quota on Hukou conversions, and the number of 
conversions has to date been very low. 
Yet another reform variant has promoted localized Hukou conversion through exchange 
of rural and urban entitlements. Chongqing has encouraged family migration with Hukou 
conversion, but only for those who are rural residents of Chongqing. Hukou transfer to urban 
districts requires that migrants work or do business in the area for more than five years, purchase 
commercial property, or make significant investments/ tax payments. Requirements are much 
lower for Hukou transfer in small cities and towns. The key feature is the so-called “exchanging 
three rural clothes for five urban clothes” policy: the “rural clothes” being homestead land, farm 
land, and contracted forest land, while the “urban clothes” are pension, medical insurance, 
housing, employment and education. Those converting from rural to urban Hukou can keep farm 
and homestead land and forest for three years but must give it up thereafter if they wish to retain 
their urban Hukou. 
Chengdu introduced a residence permit system with two types of permits: temporary and 
permanent. The residence permit and Hukou conversion is only open to those who are already 
residents of rural areas of Chengdu prefecture. Local migrants apply for temporary permits if 
they stay between one month and one year and for a permanent permit if staying over a year. 
Local migrants will be issued residence permits if they have contracted jobs, register for 
business, purchase housing, or are dependents of residence permit holders. Residence permit 
holders enjoy more public services and welfare than temporary residence holders and are eligible 
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for Hukou conversion (Shen Peng, 2010). 
Local reforms have been least complete in the larger urban areas that are favored by rural 
migrants, at least for migrants from outside those jurisdictions. At the same time, urban Hukou in 
small and medium cities entitles the migrant to less generous social services and social 
protection, limiting the success of policies aimed at attracting migrants to smaller cities. 
Reforms in larger cities have generally been oriented to better-skilled and richer migrants, 
significantly limiting their labor market impacts and reducing the equity benefits of reform. 
Exclusion of migrants is done in a variety of ways, for example through entry barriers on skills, 
investments, or income or through rationing by strict income/work and residence requirements. 
Above these local policy initiatives, the key change remains removing the distinction 
between rural and urban Hukou.   By March 2009, there were 13 Provinces that managed to 
accomplish this. In 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed new household registration reforms that 
would further relax the restrictions on, and requirements for, urban settlement. Wen pointed out 
that both central and local government should solve a series of problems. These included liudong 
renkou employment and settlement so that they enjoyed the same treatment as urban citizens. 
According to the Chinese State Statistics Bureau, in 2008 the number of liudong renkou was 
about 230 million, which means 16% of total Chinese citizens. Most of these people live 
unofficially at the margins of Chinese urban life, ignored by local governments and urban 
residents. However, as a labor resource these people are critical for China’s economic 
development. While they work in cities, liudong renkou cannot convert from agricultural Hukou 
to non-agricultural Hukou. Even if they have children in cities where they work, their children 
are still designated as nonresident outsiders. The resulting widespread socioeconomic inequality 
and exclusion are outgrowths of China’s persistent dual classification of Hukou registration. 
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III. Scholarly Interpretations of the Hukou System 
Scholarly treatments of Hukou differ not so much in their overall assessment of the 
system’s significance as in their focus on particular aspects or consequences of it. Moreover, 
with the rapid growth of China’s economy and the relaxation of Hukou restrictions after 2001, 
attention has turned away from Hukou as a means of social control and towards its role in the 
country’s future socioeconomic development. 
The evolution of the Hukou system over the last half century is an integral part of China’s 
experience of industrialization. Both are aspects of the larger narrative of China’s state-promoted 
economic development, in particular its extraction of economic surplus from the agricultural 
economy in order to finance industrialization and the growth of urban areas. The single most 
important economic fact about China is its enormous population, and it is this resource which 
China has traditionally exploited. China’s Hukou system from the beginning of the communist 
era contributed to the mobilization of an inexpensive surplus labor force to be employed in state-
owned industries. The later advent of economic development strategies more sympathetic to 
capitalism did not change this basic reliance upon cheap labor. Beyond its strictly economic 
significance, the Hukou system of household registration, along with the system of ethnic 
identification, creates a multitude of civic categories, resulting in what Hilary Josephs (2010) 
calls the “invisible walls” that separate the population of China into various socio-legal 
categories which blunt the emergence of a common sense of civic identity. 
The most comprehensive recent treatment of Hukou is Fei-Ling Wang’s Organizing 
Through Division and Exclusion—China’s Hukou System (2005). Fang not only examines its 
significance from a social and political, as well as economic point of view, but also assesses the 
meaning of  recent reforms. 
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Emerging out of the struggles with the Kuomintang in the late 1940s,  Hukou 
subsequently evolved into a framework for distributing scarce goods, and underpinned a basic 
distinction between cities and the countryside. With economic liberalization, Hukou served to 
limit the amount of rural-to-urban migration, thus enabling China to industrialize without the 
problems of uncontrollable urbanization. The key function of the Hukou system, in Wang’s 
account, has been its service in handling the so-called “Lewis Transition” in China’s rapid 
economic development, namely the redeployment of low-productivity and surplus agricultural 
labor into industrial work to the point where factory wages begin to rise. 
In its economic aspect, Hukou has contributed to China’s high growth rate in a dual 
economy where the rural areas serve as reservoirs of labor that can be deployed into export-
oriented industrial zones. At the same time, it places limits on the development of a market 
economy may represent a break upon future growth. The population controls the Hukou system 
imposes contribute to relative social stability in a large country experiencing rapid economic 
development. This stability also serves the ruling interests of the Communist Party, which 
nurtures its legitimacy by delivering improved living conditions to ever-larger numbers of 
citizens. 
Ultimately, Wang contends, the Hukou system sustains the coexistence of a rapidly 
developing, fairly diverse, dynamic market economy and a stable communist one-party 
authoritarian regime. China has so far managed high growth rates and technological progress, 
even while preserving a dual economy that has managed to contain the growth of urban regions 
to manageable rates. It is significant that urban slums which might have resulted from 
uncontrolled rural-urban migration are basically absent from Chinese cities. Yet the Hukou 
system maintains a dual Chinese economy and market segmentation that together lead to 
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inefficiency and waste. If, over time, the benefits of the Hukou system dwindle, as there is no 
guarantee of a real and speedy spillover or trickle-down effect of the “in”, prosperous urban 
sector in coastal China upon the excluded rural and inland regions. This will be especially the 
case if local authorities use Hukou status as an economic development device for attracting 
coveted (rich, skilled) residence from elsewhere (Wang 2004). In this event, the Hukou-derived 
distinction between agricultural and urban residence will increasingly map onto the more general 
socioeconomic distinctions between poor and rich. 
The degree to which the Hukou system reinforces patterns of socioeconomic inequality is 
a theme explored in different ways by other writers. Examining the economic circumstances of 
temporary migrant workers, Jianfa Shen (2006) finds that such workers experience low income 
and greater physical risks in adverse working conditions. Temporary migrants also lack access to 
the safety nets available to permanent residences. This includes limited access to public services 
such as affordable public education for their offspring, social housing and basic public health. 
Finally, because of their unofficial status temporary migrants have limited recourse to the law for 
their own protections and are often unable to assert their rights under the law.  
Li Zhang (2011) stresses the economic consequences of the different legal status of 
Hukou registrations. The urban employment rights of rural migrants again only limited 
recognition within the limits of residence policies for temporary workers. Zhang finds that the 
citizenship embodied in the Hukou system is closely associated with the marginalized status of 
rural migrants, which is often quite low in comparison to local urban Hukou holders. Rural 
migrants are excluded on the basis of their rural Hukou registration, which bars them from 
enjoying equal job opportunities to those of the state-designated urbanites. This, in turn, limits 
their entitlement to social services, and strips them of the right to full urban citizenship. 
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In short, temporary migrants are more vulnerable than permanent migrants. The low 
socioeconomic status of temporary migrants is reinforced by the inertia of the Hukou system as a 
whole, particularly as it affects the distribution of educational, social service, and welfare 
provisions available to urban and rural areas and populations. 
Beyond its significance for China’s patterns of socioeconomic inequality, the Hukou 
system has had an impact on other macroeconomic variables, notably the composition of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its savings rate. These variables are in turn linked 
to the land policies which have characterized China’s urbanization. As Yasheng Huang (2010) 
argues, Chinese land remains in public ownership, and the disposition of land has been deeply 
involved with the longevity of the Hukou system since 1979 (Chan [2009] also highlights the 
connection between population control and land policies). The legal status of land and the lack of 
private property in the form of land assumes particular importance given that Chinese 
urbanization process has proceeded by increasing the number of cities rather than by growth in 
the existing cities. 
The way in which urbanization has occurred in China has had important effects on the 
income and consumption behavior throughout the Chinese population, both urban and rural alike. 
In particular, personal consumption has a percentage of GDP has declined, even as the country 
becomes more urbanized and the overall GDP per capita has increased. Chinese urbanization 
reflects the broad attempt by millions of rural migrant workers to improve their lives, but it also 
may have increased their propensity to save given the legal and material uncertainties fostered by 
the persistence of the Hukou system. Lacking access to social benefits and other resources that 
accompany Hukou registration, the millions of liudong renkou compensate by saving more of 
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their incomes. As a result, their living standards are lower and China’s economy as a whole 
experiences a lower level of personal consumption that would otherwise prevail. 
Zhou Xiaochuang, the governor of China’s central bank, has himself argued that during 
the urbanization process, compared to corporate profits, personal income grew relatively slowly. 
He observed that the overwhelming majority of Chinese laborers have been left out of the rising 
prosperity found in the corporate sector. In response to this growing imbalance, Zhou has 
advocated measures to increase the net worth of ordinary citizens in order to discourage an 
abnormally high and growing savings rate. Moreover, the IMF also contends that China’s 
household income lags the country’s GDP growth, and that this too is a factor accounting for 
stagnant personal consumption. 
One feature of the Hukou system which feeds through to a higher savings rate than would 
otherwise prevail is the differential access to educational resources. Having an urban Hukou 
registration opens up inexpensive educational opportunities to the children of Hukou holders. In 
contrast, those holding rural Hukou are afflicted with a double disadvantage. The first is that, 
when away from their original place of registry, rural Hukou holders can’t make use of the 
school system for which their children would be eligible. The second disadvantage is that, in 
order to provide for their children’s education, they are obliged to pay tuition for private schools, 
the expense of which encourages household saving. 
China’s trend in domestic consumption, in saving rates, and in its urbanization patterns 
all seem to reinforce the same imbalance in China’s economic development. The growth of 
temporary migrant populations in urban areas seems to have been accompanied by a fall in the 
consumption component of the Chinese economy. Hukou-related status differences tend to 
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dampen consumption growth, thus reinforcing China’s reliance upon exports and capital 
investment as drivers of economic growth.  
In its recent comprehensive report on China’s economic prospects, The World Bank 
(2012) links the effects of the Hukou system to future labor market trends. Both Hukou reform 
and locally administered insurance schemes are necessary in order to facilitate the massive shifts 
in manpower which China’s modernization requires. As millions of workers relocate for 
employment opportunities, China’s labor markets must offer both flexibility and protection for 
workers. This security includes not just some predictability in their employment, but the 
existence of a social safety net that includes portable pensions and health care. Labor market 
reforms that make it more flexible and more responsive to shifting employment needs are key to 
China’s aspirations to grow into a high-income, diversified economy. However tardy it is Hukou 
reform is critical though progress will likely be slow because it will depend upon so many other 
policy changes. 
Unlike the past, the current Hukou system doesn’t prevent people from moving from the 
country to the city. Yet those migrants lacking urban Hukou status are deprived of urban Hukou 
entitlements such as health insurance, schooling, and housing. One thing that makes Hukou 
reform more difficult is that local governments lack the wherewithal and the will to offer public 
services to non-registered migrants and their dependents.  So the success of Hukou reform 
depends on how capable local governments are in reforming and managing their own finances, 
and how fiscal burdens are shared across governmental levels. If local governments aren’t able to 
deliver to migrant populations the same level of social support that is granted to urban residents, 
then this has adverse implications not only for economic inequality but for social mobility.  As 
Section II described, Hukou reform at the local level has been active. However, the costs 
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involved means that those places where migrants are most concentrated—the largest cities—are 
precisely those areas where reform has been most hesitant. By way of contrast, smaller and 
medium-sized cities have found the challenge of providing migrants with social services to be 
less of a burden.  
Income inequalities are worsened by differences in asset ownership, particularly housing. 
Housing is estimated to account for around 60 percent of household wealth and for almost two 
thirds of the inequality of wealth among households. While most rural and urban Hukou 
registrants owned their housing by the mid-2000s, fewer than 10 percent of migrant households 
owned housing in their city of residence in 2007. In addition, while housing wealth increased 
rapidly for all homeowners between 2002 and 2007, the rate of annual increase for urban 
households of 15–20 percent was more than double the increase for their rural counterparts. As a 
result, per capita urban housing wealth went from 4.5 times that of rural households in 2002 to 
7.2 times only five years later, a gap significantly higher than the urban-rural income gap (World 
Bank 2012). 
One way to dramatize the effect of rising urban housing prices on the wealth gap is to 
contrast some of China’s major cities with their international counterparts. As Figure 1 shows, 
the income-to-price ratio in major Chinese urban housing markets is much higher than in other 








Source: Reproduced from: http://www.economicsfanatic.com/2012/05/evidence-of-enormity-in-
chinas-real.html 
Income inequalities also influence access to social services and social protection. The 
Hukou system reinforces income disparities by increasing the costs of services like education, 
health care, and housing for migrant households. Migrant workers are also less able to access 
lucrative employment opportunities in the public sector or with state-owned enterprises, and face 
greater challenges than do local workers in securing high-paying work even outside these 
sectors.  
China’s urbanization is facing several demographic challenges. China moved from under 
20 percent urban population in 1980 to almost 50 percent by 2010, and is expected to have 
around two thirds of people living in urban areas by 2030. This has contributed to structural 
transformation and higher productivity, facilitated by easing of population mobility restrictions 
in the Hukou system. However, the failure to address entitlement reform for migrants through 
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incomplete reforms of Hukou and the ongoing challenges of managing farmers losing their land 
to urban expansion has meant that there remains a fundamental segmentation between the local 
urban Hukou population and the non-urban Hukou population. 
Lack of portability of pension rights has acted as an additional barrier to the mobility of 
workers, both across space and also across sectors within urban areas. Until very recently, there 
have been no national guidelines for portability of accumulated pension rights when moving to a 
different city or when moving employment from one subsystem of the urban pension system to 
another. The level of pooling of contributions has been highly localized, with only recent efforts 
to pool partially to the provincial level. As a result, workers face uncertainty when moving to a 
different place or taking up a different occupation. To the extent that this limits labor mobility 
and the efficient deployment of the work force, this will reduce China’s productivity growth 
(World Bank 2012). 
Fang Cai (2011) not only depicts the Hukou system reform in the context of China’s 
transition towards a market economy but underscores how China’s economic reform was itself 
initiated in rural areas (see also Chan 2009). In the initial stage, reform began with incentives 
introduced into agriculture that increased production, thereby rendering large numbers of 
agricultural workers redundant. As a consequence, Chinese farmers, after fulfilling their needs 
for basic living, began to seek off-farm work to increase their incomes. The intention of 
economic reform at that time was not abandonment of the planned system; therefore, Hukou 
system reform actually took place without a clear blueprint of the overall reform, and it was 
characterized by labor movement from agricultural to industrial and service occupations even in 
rural areas, and from villages to nearby towns. 
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Post 1979, then, the Hukou system evolved in a way that contributed to China’s 
emergence as the world’s premier low-cost manufacturer, as surplus peasant labor was activated 
to take their places in coastal export processing zones. Although China’s economy has grown to 
be much more complex and sophisticated in the intervening thirty years, the basic premise of its 
industrialization strategy remains in place. Without this massive migration of labor, China’s 
basic model for engaging an integrated global capitalist system would not have been possible. 
 Even though the expanded labor mobility produced reform to a certain extent, the Hukou 
system still served two traditional roles. 
First, the Hukou system has guaranteed the priority of urban laborers to obtain 
employment in urban sectors. Second, the Hukou system excluded migrants from obtaining equal 
access to urban social welfare. In the course of tackling the employment crisis in the late 1990s, 
local governments built a preliminary social protection system for urban workers, including a 
basic pension, health-care insurance and unemployment insurance, and a minimum living 
standard guarantee scheme. Although these programs did not apply fully to all urban workers, 
they officially included all workers with urban Hukou status and excluded rural migrants. In 
addition, migrant workers could not participate in job search and job training programs, thus 
reducing their employment opportunities. 
With mass rural-urban labor migration, the labor surplus in agriculture shrank, as did the 
growth rate of the working age population. However, rapid economic growth has continued to 
generate a huge demand for labor that has outstripped its supply. Since 2003, the difficulty of 
hiring migrant workers, or a more general labor shortage, has become widespread and wages of 
migrant workers have significantly increased year by year. In addition, the wage rates of workers 
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in agricultural sectors have also increased, indicating that shortages in one area has implications 
for wage rates in other areas. 
In terms of governments’ incentives for Hukou system reform, Cai notes two facts: 
First, shortages of migrant labor, which first emerged in 2003 and became severe after the 
recovery of the economy from the financial crisis of 2008, has affected enterprises’ ability to 
produce at full output. As a response to this, local governments in coastal areas, where 
enterprises struggle to recruit workers, have included Hukou system reform among policy 
measures to stabilize labor supply. 
Second, with the strict control over arable land use, the only way that local governments 
can exploit land to boost urbanization is to reclaim the plots of contracted arable land and 
housing sites left behind by those who have migrated away and to use the quota of those plots 
elsewhere to balance the reclamation and exploitation of land. 
According to Chan and Buckingham (2008), China is attempting to jettison the use of 
nongzhuanfei in some areas without abandoning Hukou entirely. With a more decentralized 
administration of Hukou, nongzhuanfei is no longer integral to the system, though getting rid of 
it doesn’t necessarily imply the end of Hukou or some new era of unrestricted movement. 
Indeed, with the decentralization of the system, barriers to movement increasingly take the form 
of incentives that are intended to attract desirable migrants—the well-educated, the wealthy, 
etc.—that are not available to less desirable migrants. The removal of formal migration barriers 
in effect applies only to these favored groups as a practical matter. What used to be a 
socioeconomic divide governed by the distinction between ‘‘agricultural’’ and 
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‘‘nonagricultural’’ Hukou has now been transformed into a more general gulf between outsiders 
and insiders. 
Chan (2009) points out the importance of land policies in the evolution of Hukou. As 
peasants have entered the ranks of a mobile workforce, their land has become available to local 
and regional authorities seeking to promote industrialization or other urban construction projects. 
Recent examples of forced acquisitions of land have been the catalysts for protests and other 
expressions of mass discontent. 
Sun and Fan (2009) contend that Hukou policy over time has been governed by two 
trends. First, restrictions on rural-to-urban Hukou transfers have been loosened. Second, the type 
of migrant entering the population stream has changed over time. Early movers tended to be 
more skilled, motivated and ambitious. Now that migrant networks have emerged knitting 
together origins and destinations, the opportunity costs of migration have fallen, and new 
generations of migrants possessing fewer skills and less drive are attempting the same transition. 
As a result, permanent migrants tend to look different—more educated and prosperous—than do 
the latest waves of temporary migrants. The dynamic of migration over time thus reinforces the 
perception and reality of an urban underclass. 
Events like the global financial crisis of 2008 are felt disproportionately by temporary 
migrant workers. Though migration in general tends to result in higher standards of living, 
temporary migrants still experience far greater uncertainty in their life chances, and the relative 
lack of a safety net results in a much riskier and more marginal existence. 
Indeed, the implications of these changes in Hukou lead Zhan (2011) to argue that the 
system no longer plays a determining role in the socioeconomic prospects of migrant workers. 
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Even if Hukou were abolished, the income and wealth gaps that have emerged would not narrow. 
In fact, Zhang and Zhu (2010) find that Hukou categories have been internalized into the 
corporate practices of human resource management. Even if migratory regulations are relaxed, 
discrimination practices and outcomes will persist. The legacy of the Hukou system affects the 
behavior of private economic actors as well as the actions of public officials at all levels. 
In their study of Shanghai, Zhang and Wang (2008) argue that civic status has little 
practical significance for most rural migrants, since urban Hukou status increasingly reflects the 
resources and skill sets the migrants bring instead of their mere residence. As urban governments 
use population registration rules as a means of cherry-picking the more desirable migrants, 
residency status becomes in practice a reward for migrants’ functional capacities rather than an 
acknowledgement of their civic entitlements. 
The way in which responsibility for market-oriented reforms has been applied also shapes 
the incentives of municipal governments. Along with control over Hukou policy, local 
governments have also become responsible for fiscal commitments (especially for social 
welfare) that used to be managed by the central state. Municipalities have been forced to assume 
greater responsibility and discretion in how they carry out fiscal policies. Promoting economic 
development is has become a key source of municipal income, and local governments prioritize 
it. Control over Hukou status becomes a variable that local governments can manipulate in ways 
consistent with their development objectives. The case of Shanghai in particular underscores the 
interest local governments have in making it difficult for migrants to settle permanently who 
might become burdens upon local resources. 
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Because local governments look dimly upon temporary migrants when it comes to social 
welfare, this population tends to retain enduring links with their migratory points of origin. The 
expense and insecurity of urban living encourage migrants to keep the rest of their families 
elsewhere. Indeed, rural rights to land use may be the only fall-back that temporary migrants 
have if their economic circumstances worsen. Though migrants as a whole are permanent 
participants in urban life, their networks of social protection are still rooted in the countryside 
from which they first moved. 
This survey of scholarship on the Hukou system highlights how the persistence of Hukou 
during the thirty-plus years of China’s rapid economic development has increasingly tied 
together policy problems in a way that threatens to put a break on China’s future economic 
development. A system of population control that, at least initially, seemed useful in managing 
the stresses of China’s rapid urbanization may be aggravating income inequality, and reinforcing 
patterns of social exclusion that may increase political tensions in the future. This thesis will 
return to some of the policy tensions arising out of Hukou reform in Section V. Next, however, 









IV. Land Policy and Chengzhongcun 
The fundamental land policy of China is all land belongs to government or rural 
collectivities instead of citizens. Citizens or groups don’t have any proprietorship of China’s 
land, they just have rights to use it, and such rights are not indefinite but expire after a certain 
amount of time. What is more, the rights of land use can be traded by citizens or government, but 
neither former nor latter can trade land itself in China, in other words, there is an absolute 
subjection relationship between land and Chinese national government. However, the rural and 
urban land policies are different (rural land belongs to rural collectivity while urban land belongs 
to national or local government), and such differences make a huge impact on China’s 
urbanization. 
According to the “Land Management Law of People’s Republic of China”, if the 
government wants to take land from peasants (such expropriation are compulsive), the local 
governments should give compensations to those landless peasants, the amount of such 
compensations will depend on local price of land and economic and political condition. Citizens 
and enterprises can also buy rights of land use from peasant for commercial use. Such actions 
subjectively promote the urbanization of China. Nevertheless, those trades also triggered several 
problems. The first is the gap between the demand for construction land and the amount of land 
allocated. In order to prevent the problems brought by overly rapid urbanization, the Chinese 
government made a controlled allocation for construction land using according to different 
provinces’ development. However, such allocations have often been challenged because of the 
large construction land demand from citizens, enterprises and even local governments, and those 
people always ignore such allocation. 
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Second, low connection between the target of cultivated land protection and social 
economic development, such contradiction can satisfy neither enough cultivated land for 
domestic grain production nor social and economic development. Third, increasingly social 
contradiction from land expropriation, this problem is little bit complicated: the compensations 
of land expropriation are too low to satisfy peasants’ expectation; there is no unified land 
management law to regulate such actions; uneven distribution of interests of land use; those 
landless peasants have no subsistence guarantee after they “sold” their land; Hukou status 
conversions are quite sluggish in the process of urbanization (Li 2011).  
Besides, during the process of high-speed urbanization, more and more peasants “sold” 
their cultivated land to government or enterprises and become landless peasants with agricultural 
Hukou status or citizens with non-agricultural Hukou status. However, only few of them gain 
satisfactory compensations from local governments or enterprises and get rich (depending on 
their lands’ locations), most of landless peasants and new urban residents are still living under 
the average living level. Therefore, such phenomenon creates a new problem: chengzhongcun 
(urban village).  
Chengzongcuns used to be villages, during the process of urbanization, all their cultivated 
lands were commandeered, then, most of those landless peasants became urban residents and 
their residences were gradually surrounded by urban areas and finally became parts of cities. 
Nevertheless, even though living in the cities, some of those residents’ Hukou statuses are still 
agricultural Hukou and their public administration systems are still based on rural models (since 
there is no unified household management law to regulate such Hukou status conversion, and 
depend on different provinces’ developmental situations of urbanization, some of those landless 
peasant are still keep their agricultural Hukou statuses), what is worse, the infrastructure, living 
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condition, social and economic development of those chengzhongcuns are far behind those of 
modern cities. They are forgotten by time and modern city management and they also make a 
huge barrier to Chinese cities’ development.  
For example, Beijing alone once had 311 chengzhongcuns, with a total population of 
about 0.715 million and covering about 9,500,000 acres of urban land. Because of the 2008 
Beijing Olympic Games, Beijing government decided to thoroughly rectify and reform the 
capital’s lay-out, so they started to remove those chengzhongcuns and transformed them became 
urban greenbelts, shopping centers or modern residential areas since 2004. For those original 
residents who owned houses in chengzhongcuns, depend on what their old houses would 
became, they can get compensations or new residences from government. For those temporary 
residents and floating population, they were required to move to other areas unconditionally 
(Duan 2010). 
In China, each big city has several chengzhongcuns, depend on their conditions and 
environments, the reform plans of chengzhongcuns are largely identical but with minor 
differences. 
The residents of chengzhongcun are composed by villagers, townspeople and transient 
populations (peasant-workers, migrant workers and people even without any household register), 
and the recurrent population is also the main component of crime groups, so the security 
situation of chengzhongcun always be the main hidden danger of cities’ environment. What is 
more, the urban planning of chengzhongcun is very disordered, disorderly and unsystematic 
illegal buildings can be seen everywhere, incomplete infrastructure and bad sanitary condition 
make the living condition of chengzhongcuns stay at a quite low level (Wang 2009). 
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Subjectively, chengzhongcuns are products which created by dual rural-urban management 
system and dual system of land ownership. The former means that cities and countryside belong 
to different land management system and Hukou system. The latter means that urban land 
belongs to national government and rural land belongs to local rural collectivities. Most scholars 
believe that the dual system of land ownership is the primary cause of chengzhongcun, from the 
aspect of geography, chengzhongcun belongs to urban area, from the aspect of society and 
economy, it still cannot get rid of the shadow of countryside, accordingly, in order to reform 
such special social phenomenon, Chinese government needs to make a deep change in the field 
of fundamental land system, land ownership system and household management system (Hukou 
system). 
In fact, chengzhongcuns are kind of slums which are inevitable outcomes of urbanization. 
How to reform those slums, to eliminate their negative effects, use them to promote cities’ 
development, lower the costs of urbanization and accelerate the urbanization process became a 
serious lesson faced by many governments. During the rural-to-urban transition process, since 
the land, household registration system, population and other social factors are all part of a dual 
rural-urban management system, they were not included by unified urban planning, construction 
and management, their developments are spontaneous and blindness, therefore, their modes of 
producing, life-styles are still keep many rural characteristics, consequently, chengzhongcuns 
always make huge barriers to urban infrastructure layout (Huang and Li 2009). 
Accordingly, the reform of chengzhongcuns should not only focus on improving 
infrastructures and living conditions of those areas but also change the current dual household 
management and rural-urban management system. 
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V. Tensions Within Hukou Policy 
According to Wang (2005) while the Hukou system is outdated in crucial respects, it 
won’t disappear anytime soon. Hukou’s purpose was always to introduce divisions among the 
people that made government control easier, discourage the mobilization of political opposition, 
manage urban development, and maintain the state’s control over the economy. The Chinese 
government has aimed to overcome the dual-economy problem by promoting development of 
small cities and towns while allowing the major cities to continue to “get rich first”. 
Based on the division between the haves and the have-nots, the poor, in the cities as well 
as in the countryside, are now uniformly excluded across the nation, whereas the rich may now 
overcome the Hukou-based exclusion with ease. The increasingly combining and merging 
evolution of the Hukou exclusion with the money-based institutional exclusion appears to be the 
new basis for dividing and organizing the Chinese in the years ahead. 
Wang (2005) stresses the dilemma which Chinese government is facing: on one hand, the 
government uses current household registration management system to limit rural-urban 
migration in order to balance the urban and rural development and regional development, 
decompress those eastern big cities, keep enough agricultural population in countryside to 
maintain the agricultural industry. On the other hand, government also wants surplus rural labor 
force move to cities to promote the industrialization and urbanization. At present, many big 
companies cannot recruit enough workers in coastal area, since most of those companies are 
labor intensive industries, consequently, without enough workers, they cannot sustain their 
business normally. The reasons for  this phenomenon are several. First and foremost, the 
limitation of dual Hukou system, because of it is really hard to settle in the coastal area if ones 
Hukou status is agricultural Hukou, many of peasant-workers choose to find jobs in other places. 
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Second, the speed of salary growth is slower than the growth of living costs in those eastern big 
cities especially the high costs of housing. Third, in recent years, the Chinese central and western 
regions increasingly need labor forces for their own development, so they made a series of 
preferential policies to encourage workers to stay in their homelands. Such phenomena will 
cause population transfers away from those eastern big cities when their urbanization is still 
incomplete. This result will surely injure China’s development. Accordingly, it is no time to 
delay to the reform of household registration system. 
The consequences of the Hukou system may be addressed not only by its reform, but by 
other policies aimed at fixing its effects. For example, Jianfa Shen ( 2011 ) suggests that more 
educational resources and opportunities should be made available to the rural areas and rural 
population. This is one component of a feasible solution to China’s economic development 
bottlenecks, particularly in areas away from the coast which have been traditional sources of 
migrant labor. Making the countryside a more desirable place to live would, over the longer 
term, moderate China’s challenge in managing its surplus labor and keeping land available for 
productive agricultural use. 
The growing relative backwardness of rural areas is also worsened by urban-oriented 
development strategies themselves. According to Li Zhang (2011), urban residency rights have 
been used to grab mobile capital and human resources on the one hand, and to exclude some 
members of society from accessing public services in cities on the other. In this context, the 
abandonment of control of urban residency rights by city governments and the recognition of 
migrants’ equal citizenship rights in cities remain a considerable policy challenge for building 
the harmonious society that China’s elites favor.  
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Indeed, while nongzhuanfei was once central to the Hukou system, it is no longer relevant 
in the current, more decentralized policy environment. Improving migrant workers’ life chances 
will require policies or interventions that effectively enhance migrant workers’ position within 
the market and reduce their social exclusion (Zhan 2011). Reforms would be beneficial not just 
to the rural population, but to the urbanites themselves. While urbanization under the constraints 
of Hukou has boosted migrants’ standard of living, it may nonetheless have restrained their 
consumption because of their perceived need to save income against adverse contingencies. 
Figure 2 
Growth in China’s Urbanization Rate 
 
Source: Reproduced from:  http://google.brand.edgar-
online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtmlSection1?SectionID=6898114-220674-
232176&SessionID=8EsGHFiwbTrC4J7 
The decline of China’s consumption as a percentage of GDP seems associated with 
China’s urbanization. Indeed, urbanization seems to have the perverse consequence of 
dampening workers’ propensity to consume. Zhang (2011) argues, in effect, that the right way to 
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wean the Chinese economy away from its excessive dependence upon export-oriented 
industrialization would involve reforms to the Hukou system as well as the introduction of some 
form of private land ownership. Thus, Hukou reform cannot be undertaken without regard for 
these other policy areas. 
The World Bank (2012) puts Hukou reform in the context of shifting political interests in 
the country. The benefits of reform are nationwide, but the costs are borne locally in terms of 
which level of government pays for services that are accessed by Hukou registrants. For this 
reason, a coordinated reform effort is a major challenge from a collective action point of view. 
Cities only capture some of the benefits of financing entitlement reform, and the localized 
returns on investments remain unclear with a mobile migrant population. While their localized 
choices not to fund or to underfund basic services for migrants are understandable, the result is 
inferior from the national point of view. 
If China were to move to a more consumption-based economy, this would require 
workers not to save so much of their incomes. Yet China’s high savings rates reflect in part the 
absence of an adequate safety net. Figure 3 illustrates how domestic consumption as a 









Domestic Consumption in the Chinese Economy 
 
Source: Reproduced from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/31/can-china-fight-inflation-
while-rebalancing-its-economy/46v 
 
This decline in the consumption component of GDP reflects not only China’s dependence 
upon exports and infrastructure investments as drivers of growth, but the high savings rates of 









China’s Domestic Consumption and Savings Rates 
  
Source: Reproduced from: http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/china-consumer-spending-vs-
savings/ 
 
In The World Bank’s view, portable pension rights require the  national pooling of social 
insurance contributions. This is a long-held goal of national policy, not only for pensions but also 
for health insurance. However, progress has been slower than hoped, with partial provincial 
pooling only recently being achieved. For health insurance, pooling to date has tended to be even 
lower down the system at the prefecture or county level. Higher-level pooling of pension and 
eventually health insurance contributions would be the single most effective measure to facilitate 
portability. 
Hukou system reform has to be comprehensive, including better social protection policy 
in urban areas as well as fairer management of arable land. Fairer management must include an 
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end to the forced expropriation of farmland which has been the source of much popular 
discontent (Chan 2009).  In addition to encouraging various reform initiatives by local 
governments, the central government should put forward general guidelines regarding the 
content and coverage of social security programs, as well as methods of managing plots of 
vacated land (Cai 2011). The need for comprehensive reform was underscored by the world 
economic crisis beginning in 2008. By February 2009, China’s Ministry of Agriculture estimated 
that nearly 20 million temporary migrants had become unemployed, causing some to return to 
their places of origin. The potential for social unrest was significant. Although the exact figure 
may be open to debate, the economic disruptions of 2008 made it obvious that in a downturn in 
manufacturing output, the temporary migrant workers experience the brunt of the resulting 
unemployment (Sun and Fan 2009). 
In sum, the legacy of China’s Hukou system has the potential to lock the country into an 
undesirable path of economic development. The lack of integration of migrants into their new 
urban environments, abetted by various barriers to formal urban Hukou status, has rendered 
China’s urbanization only a partial success (Zhang and Wang 2010). Too many of the urban 
population lack roots and rights of permanent residents. Even for those migrants that have 
resided for many years, municipal governments have undertaken little systematic effort to 
formalize their residency status as permanent citizens. Though they are part of urban economic 
and social life, temporary migrants are bereft of any official identity. Indeed, municipalities have 
a financial incentive not to recognize their status claims, since this would open governments up 
to increased fiscal obligations. For their part, temporary migrants have responded predictably by 
holding on to their rural connections as a substitute for a non-existent urban safety net. Not only 
do they maintain rural registrations in order to preserve claims to land use, they also choose to 
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leave their families at their points of origin so as to minimize the expenses of urban life. Keeping 
ties to their rural origins isn’t per se a bad thing. However, when it is an adaptive response to 
policies of civic exclusion, the implication becomes that China’s population management 
practices have given rise to a large mass of unintegrated and rootless workers, mostly men, who 
lack the support and stability provided by the primary institution of the family. The prospect of 
such an urban demographic poses not only an economic challenge, but also has disturbing 
















In order to keep the labor force working in its positions so as to guarantee China’s 
national development at a steady and efficient rate, the Chinese government formulated the 
Hukou system soon after the establishment of the PRC. The system indeed made a huge positive 
impact on China’s social, political and economic development in early years. However, with the 
development of China’s industrialization, urbanization, market economy and the globalization 
process, the negative effects of this inflexible and antiquated system are increasingly obvious. 
There are many scholars who think that the Hukou system is no longer appropriate for 
China’s further development since such system is a huge barrier for China’s labor supply and 
mobility, therefore, in order to keep China’s steady and high-speed development, the Hukou 
system should be abolished and replaced by modern Western household registration system 
which is more flexible and free than Hukou system. 
While there is much that is sound in the scholarly and policy criticism of the current 
effects of Hukou, there are plausible reasons for why it needs a thorough reform that falls short 
of complete replacement. Above all, it must be kept in mind that Hukou has evolved in an 
institutional and policy context that is peculiarly Chinese. China is a communist country which 
has a totally different land policy, social, political and economic system compared to western 
world. To some extent, the logic of the Hukou system has been intimately linked with China’s 
special land ownership. In China, all land belongs to government or rural collectivities instead of 
citizens. Private citizens or groups don’t have any proprietorship of China’s land, they just have 
rights to use it. This paradigm of land management has been an integral part of China’s planned 
economic system and agriculture-based national policy. At present, the latter two have already 
beoame history, but the state-owned land system is still in place. What is more, in the Chinese 
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special socialist political and economic system, the traditional view of urban-rural difference and 
other factors also affect the development of China’s household registration reform. Therefore, it 
is almost impossible to abolish Hukou unilaterally since it combined with China’s land policy 
and other communist policies to be a systemic entirety. Even if the Chinese government repealed 
the current Hukou system and replaced it by western household registration system, no one can 
forecast if it will match China’s special socialist regime and no one can guarantee such new 
system will be stable will not bring new problems under the socialist system. Consequently, at 
least at present and in the near future, the only way to eliminate Hukou system’s negative effects 
on China’s future development is to reform it instead of abolish it, given the current political and 
economic system. 
On the other hand, the Hukou system still has its positive effects to China’s social 
stability and development such as its management of zhongdian renkou (targeted people) ------
citizens who may do something harmful to society are specially and focally monitored and 
controlled by the Hukou police for the purpose of social control and crime fighting. Those 
targeted people including minority militants (especially Tibetan, Uyghur, Huis, and other 
Muslim nationalities), citizens who have criminal records, activists and other citizens who may 
be a threat to social stability and peace. Moreover, China’s urbanization is still immature. Its 
urban capacity is far from able to satisfy all citizens’ need since most of Chinese residents want 
to work and live in cities which have better infrastructure and other resources than rural areas. As 
a consequence, the Hukou system’s function of population adjustment is still useful to China’s 
current situation. In addition, the Hukou system can also balance the urban and rural 
development and regional development, restrain the growth of eastern mega-cities, while 
keeping enough agricultural population in the countryside to maintain the agricultural industry. 
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In fact, since the beginning of 21th century, in order to satisfy the needs of the 
development of market economy and guarantee enough cheap labors for coastal areas, the 
Chinese government was increasingly loosening its highly control of household registration, 
people can move to any city and convert their Hukou status if they up to relevant standard. 
Nevertheless, the rural-urban differences within the Hukou system are still in place. Such 
differences not only enlarge the rural-urban gap but also make those citizens who live or work in 
cities without local Hukou experience unfair treatment. This aspect of Hukou is a main 
contradiction which can be called a hidden danger or encumbrance of China’s current and future 
development. What Chinese government needs to reform is the rural-urban differences of the 
Hukou system instead of totally repudiating and abolishing it. 
However, this old problem is quite complicated which cannot be solved easily. For those 
peasant-workers and migrant workers who want to move to cities and convert their Hukou status 
from agricultural to non-agricultural, they need to buy residences or work legally and formally in 
cities for at least two years. The former will be easy and fast, but few of them can afford the 
current Chinese urban housing price, accordingly, most of them will rent residences first and 
choose the latter method, and the problems are concentrated on latter coincidentally. Those 
peasant-workers, migrant workers and floating workers who don’t have local Hukou cannot 
share same social resources and opportunities with local residents especially in the field of their 
children’s education, social insurance and welfare. What is worse, those requirements of Hukou 
status’ conversion and unfair treatments may stop surplus rural labors and migrant workers from 
moving to cities for work, with adverse implications for China’s urbanization, industrialization 
and modernization. On the other hand, since the main contradiction between huge number of 
Chinese population and their increasingly material and mental needs and the limited social 
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resource is still acute. It is a genuine and substantial challenge for the Chinese government to 
satisfy all its citizens’ needs. At this point, the reform of Hukou system is a lengthy and tough 
journey. Even if China’s prosperity were to rise to the level of a developed country, the 
contradictions embedded in Hukou would require a long time to be alleviated. 
Ultimately, the dilemma is that the restrictive effects of the Hukou system upon China’s 
urbanization interact with the limits upon China’s hard power. Yet it is as unlikely to see 
replaced the current Hukou system with a western household registration system, as it would be 
to see the current socialist Chinese regime replaced with a capitalist one. Therefore, the first and 
foremost step to reform the current Hukou system is to develop China’s economic power and 
comprehensive strength. Then, after Chinese government accumulates enough social wealth, the 
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